Reaction to Michael Oriard’s “NCAA Academic Reform: History, Context and Challenges” by Smith, Ronald A.
22
Journal of Intercollegiate Sport, 2012, 5, 22-26 
© 2012 Human Kinetics, Inc.
Reaction to Michael Oriard’s  
“NCAA Academic Reform:  
History, Context and Challenges”
Ronald A. Smith
Penn State University
The purpose of this paper is to provide a response to Michael Oriard’s keynote 
address. Similar to Oriard’s analysis, the author adopts a historical approach to 
examine academic reform and its drivers within the intercollegiate athletics context. 
The author suggests that faculties, students, and boards of trustees should play key 
roles in academic reforms, and also proposes several reform options. 
As anyone who has ever read one of Michael Oriard’s several books or has listened 
to his presentations on college sport, you know that his work is thorough and schol-
arly. He is like a dedicated athlete who trains well, competes vigorously, and gets 
up when he is hit to compete once again. He is the consummate scholar athlete. 
But he is also a faculty member at a big-time institution, so you know from past 
experience that, relative to faculty, few of those in power will listen and act on his 
analysis of intercollegiate athletics. 
To some extent, we share each other’s shoes historically, as we both played 
intercollegiate athletics, Michael in football with Notre Dame and I in basketball 
and baseball at Northwestern, less than 100 miles from South Bend. We were both 
interested in the liberal arts, he in literature and I in history. We both played a little 
professional sport, Mike with the Kansas City Chiefs and in the Canadian Football 
League and I in the Chicago White Sox system. We have both written extensively 
on college sport, using facts, not generally opinions, pointing out both the good as 
well as problematic areas while being academics at Oregon State and Penn State 
respectively. A major difference: I don’t have back problems from being hit a few 
too many times in football. 
Michael’s summary of intercollegiate sports with an emphasis on football is 
right on point (Oriard, 2012). For one thing, there was never a shining period, a 
golden era, of college sport when amateurism was upheld and when professional-
ism and commercialism were not in existence. Commercialism began with the first 
American intercollegiate contest, a crew meet between Harvard and Yale, when 
a railroad entrepreneur paid all expenses for the two crews on a vacation lake in 
the middle of New Hampshire, far away from the two campuses. Professional-
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ism began when Yale hired the first professional coach during the American Civil 
War so that Yale might first defeat Harvard in a contest. There have been many 
reforms or attempted reforms, first attempted by students, then by faculty members 
who created athletic committees, followed by conferences usually under faculty 
control, and through most of the 20th century by the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) with presidentially appointed faculty representatives. Even 
university presidents have done a little reforming, though I might say that college 
presidents are generally cheerleaders for athletics, not reformers. For the most part, 
I have concluded in my book, Pay for Play: A History of Big-Time College Athletic 
Reform (Smith, 2011), that cheerleading presidents historically have been one of 
the major stumbling blocks to college athletic reform. It is also one of the major 
reasons why the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics has not been a 
huge success, for the Knight Commission consists almost entirely of presidents 
and ex-presidents of our colleges and universities. And, I would contend, the fact 
that the NCAA has been run by presidents or presidential appointees for about a 
century is a major reason why the NCAA has not been successful in many areas of 
academic-athletic reform. Cheerleaders do not reform athletics; they cheer them on. 
Real athletic reform would mean to me that an athlete would be representative 
academically of the student body that she or he is representing. This is not true of 
the profit-making sports at Stanford University, where Michael received his Ph.D., 
or the University of Wisconsin, where I received mine. It is principally in the most 
commercialized and professionalized sports where athletes are not representative of 
their student bodies, football and men’s basketball. There, presidential admits, called 
“set asides” by the Ivy League, dominate, and presidents set aside spaces for poor 
academic-performing but high athletic-performing individuals. It is unfortunate, 
but history indicates that presidents will not reform athletics to the point where 
athletes are academically representative of their student bodies. 
The president, historically, who tried to do the most about reform in college 
athletics was Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. That was more than 100 years ago. Eliot 
did a study of Harvard football freshman players in the 1890s. President Eliot, prob-
ably the best known university president in American history, found that Harvard 
freshman football players during the season in the mid-1890s received more failing 
grades than the total of those who received As and Bs. He also noted that football 
players at Harvard received almost 10 times more Ds than As. His solution to the 
freshman problem—create the freshman ineligibility rule so that football would 
not interfere with “their studies at the worst possible time” (Smith, 1990, p. 181). 
Within a few years, most of the big-time schools passed the freshman rule, not 
only for football players but also for all freshmen athletes. The freshman ineligi-
bility rule became almost universal in the first 7 decades of the 20th century, until 
the NCAA did away with it during the Vietnam War. How many of the presidents 
ruling the NCAA would consider the re-institution of the freshman rule today? If 
presidents want to do something about athletic reform for academic reasons, they 
would re-institute the freshman rule that was unwisely done away with by NCAA’s 
presidentially appointed representatives during the Vietnam War. Presidents would 
also reinstate the four-year (or five-year) athletic scholarship rule done away with 
about the same time. These two abolished rules were instrumental in leading col-
lege athletics to the depths of needing athletic-academic reform in the 1970s and 
1980s, and the NCAA has not dug itself out of the depths since then.
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Presently, Michael Oriard and I don’t consider the APR (Academic Progress 
Rate) even close to a major reform, even though the previous president of the 
NCAA, Myles Brand, called the APR “the most far-reaching effort of its kind in 
the history of the NCAA” (Smith, 2011, p. 183). Brand may have been a fine phi-
losopher, but he did not know his history. If Brand’s statement is true, it does not 
say much about college athletic reform since December 29, 1905, when the NCAA 
was founded. I know there are different interpretations of the APR, but I believe 
the APR more than ever emphasizes athletic eligibility, not academic development 
of athletes. Athletics under the APR emphasizes eligibility at the expense of a real 
education. The APR has probably contributed greatly to the clustering of athletes 
in particular curriculums more than any other supposed reform in the history of 
the NCAA. Why do over 8 of 10 members of the University of Michigan’s football 
team major in General Studies? Why do about three-quarters of Georgia Tech’s 
baseball, basketball, and football team members major in Management? Why do 
Stanford football players cluster in Sociology? Or American Studies at Notre Dame, 
Communications at Wake Forest, Residential Property Management at Virginia 
Tech, Sociology at Duke, Sport Management at North Carolina State, Economics 
at Harvard, and Kinesiology at Rice, to name a few? I assume that the NCAA is 
presently studying clustering in its institutions, Division I through Division III, or 
if it is not doing so, it should do so without delay. Yes, Michael Oriard is correct 
about the problem of clustering, and the APR’s pressure for maintaining eligibility, 
rather than promoting education, is greater now than ever, thanks greatly to the APR.
Oriard (2012) takes us back to the creation of the now defunct and nearly 
forgotten College Football Association (CFA) in the 1970s, when eventually the 
CFA-backed University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia waged a legal 
battle against the restricted television policy of the NCAA. Led by Georgia’s 
cheerleading president Fred Davison, who was also president of the CFA, the 
CFA-backed lawsuit defeated the strictly controlled NCAA TV plan. The result 
was a rapid expansion of commercialized television in the hands of competing 
conferences and individual institutions. One of the leaders of the CFA was the 
coach at Penn State, Joe Paterno. It was Paterno who in 1981 threatened that the 
CFA would withdraw from the NCAA unless the NCAA gave more money from 
football television receipts to CFA members. Speaking of the NCAA TV contract, 
Paterno stated, “If we’re led down the garden path [by the NCAA] one more time, 
it may be the last time” (Smith, 2001, p. 161). With the 1984 Supreme Court case 
breaking up the NCAA TV monopoly (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984), the big-
gest of the big-time conferences and institutions got what they wanted—money 
and power. It helped lead to big-time coaches becoming nearly instant millionaires 
and increasing their power within each individual institution, often with far more 
power than their school presidents.
Increased money also allowed the big-time football and men’s basketball 
programs to set up “eligibility centers,” often called academic-athletic counseling 
centers at each university. Pouring in 1 million or 2 million dollars into athletic 
counseling centers each year gave the richest schools a greater chance to keep 
athletes eligible. And generally speaking these counseling centers were separate 
from academic counseling centers and isolated from the regular university academic 
counselors. The insularity has tended to keep athletes away from academic eyes, 
whose vision might help to keep academic integrity within the counseling centers. 
NCAA Academic Reform  25
Presidents, who rule the NCAA, could put athletic counseling under academic 
control if they wished to do so. With university academic control of athletic counsel-
ing, there would be less likelihood, as Oriard has pointed out, of the athletic tutor 
scandals at Georgia, Louisiana State, Minnesota, Ohio State, and Tennessee—and 
elsewhere across the nation. 
It appears to me that real academic reform in athletics is not likely to occur until 
at least two groups are brought into the equation, possibly three groups. Faculties 
are the first, for they should be most interested in academic integrity. Boards of 
Trustees are second, for they set university policy. Policy-setting trustees should 
be made responsible for the policies of the NCAA, yet they are not represented in 
the NCAA, and therefore can be irresponsible relative to the governing of athlet-
ics. Let those who set university policy on athletics at the institutional level be 
responsible for athletic policy at the national level. Let the faculty who set academic 
standards at the institutional level become influential in setting academic standards 
at the national level. Presently, the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics (COIA) is 
generally listened to politely by the president-controlled NCAA, but then generally 
ignored. This should be reversed by incorporating COIA into the power structure 
of the NCAA. Though presidents may feel that giving faculty more power may 
diminish their own, I see it as helping presidents to achieve real academic reform 
in the NCAA and its institutions of higher learning. Presidents could, and should, 
reach out to academics if they have a mind to accomplish academic reform in 
intercollegiate athletics. Students who are athletes should also not be ignored. The 
question of how they should be involved in their own governance and involved in 
the reform equation needs to be debated and acted upon.
Since Oriard (2012) proposed no solutions to intercollegiate reform (though I 
know he has his own agenda), let me suggest several reforms that would help to raise 
the academic standards for athletes among NCAA institutions. First, immediately 
reinstate the freshman rule. Next, immediately reinstate the 4- (or 5-) year athletic 
scholarship. Third, create an official ombudsperson for athletes at each university, 
one appointed by the institution’s faculty senate, not the president. Do not make 
this a presidential appointment, like the faculty representative. The ombudsperson 
should be completely independent of institutional presidential control and to be 
the hearing board for athletes. 
A fourth solution is to demand faculty control over institutional academic affairs 
of athletes. This includes eliminating clustering of athletes in specific academic 
courses of study, revealing all academic majors of all athletes by sport, disclosing 
overall grade point averages given by instructors for athletes in all courses, and 
placing athletic counseling under university academic control. Next, officially 
recognize COIA as part of the NCAA ruling body, insuring that it is responsible 
for setting academic requirements for athletic participation. Sixth, ask Congress 
for partial anti-trust exemption so that the NCAA can control coaching salaries 
and compensation. This will allow universities to bring coaching salaries in line 
with academic salaries or at least in line with the salary of the dean of the medi-
cal school or business school. In addition, share athletic revenues more equally 
to reduce the financial incentive that may corrupt the system and further erode 
university academic values. 
As an eighth reform, eliminate clothing-shoe contract money as coaching 
compensation, using it instead for worthy projects such as financially helping 
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athletes complete their undergraduate degrees or attending graduate school—or 
giving the money for academic scholarships to deserving individuals who are not 
athletes. Next, disallow coaches or administrators who are guilty of major NCAA 
violations from ever coaching or administrating in any post-season contest with 
that or another institution. 
Finally, stop usage of the term “student athlete.” It would be controversial but 
valuable if the NCAA got rid of its half-century of official use of the term. I have 
written a 300-page book, Pay for Play, on the history of intercollegiate athletic 
reform and have never once used the term “student athlete,” or for that matter the 
terms “student musician,” “student journalist,” “student debater,” “student chemist,” 
or “student gymnast.” All college athletes are students, or should be. The term is 
no longer needed to preserve the vestige of amateurism and to thwart the threat of 
workers’ compensation and federal taxation. 
I am, however, strongly in favor of athletes who are students. I love athletics, 
and I would love to have athletes more fully integrated into our universities. And 
I would like the NCAA, not Congress or the courts, to bring about real reform of 
college athletics.
In closing, I would say, unlike some critics, the NCAA has done a great deal 
of good for college athletics in its century and more of history. However, I would 
hope that the NCAA would listen to people like Michael Oriard, a former athlete 
and a present scholar, even hire him, to promote the integration of athletics into 
our institutions of higher education. While the research findings that Oriard and 
I have produced for decades may help put reform in a historical context, faculty 
at universities must be given power if we expect to improve academic integrity 
in athletics. Presidents are in a position through the NCAA to bring faculty once 
again into the power equation if they have a mind to do so. 
References
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Oriard, M. (2012). NCAA academic reform: History, context and challenges. Journal of 
Intercollegiate Sport, 5, 4-18.
Smith, R.A. (1988). Sports and freedom: The rise of big-time college athletics. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Smith, R.A. (2001). Play-by-play: Radio, television, and big-time college sport. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Smith, R. A. (2011). Pay for play: A history of big-time college athletic reform. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press.
